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WOMEN AND JUDGING: A FEMINIST
APPROACH TO JUDGING AND THE ISSUE
OF CUSTOMARY LAW
ELEVENTH ANNUAL RUTH BADER GINSBURG
LECTURE
Prof. Susan H. Williams*
It is a great pleasure for me to be here today to deliver the Ruth
Bader Ginsburg lecture. My thanks to the Dean and to Professor Julie
Cromer-Young for inviting me; and to Donna Gehlken, who
persevered, despite my annoying travel schedule, in getting all the
necessary information to make this lecture run smoothly. Thank you
all for this brief respite from February in the mid-West.
I am particularly honored to be delivering a lecture named for,
and in the presence of, Justice Ginsburg. It is difficult to put into
words the respect and affection that I feel for the Justice. She has
been a mentor and a role model for me since I clerked for her over
twenty-five years ago. She combines tremendous kindness with
amazing brilliance and complete integrity. For me, as for so many
other women, she has been an inspiration. And for our nation as a
whole, she is a beacon of hope-hope for a world in which all women
and men are free to be valued for their talents and abilities, and in
which gender is a quality and not a limitation. My hope today is that
she will accept this lecture as a small gesture of appreciation for all
that she has done to bring us closer to that world and all that she has
meant to those of us who continue to believe in that dream.
The subject of this conference is women in the judiciary and I
am going to offer some thoughts about this subject in a context that
may be unfamiliar to many of you: the context of customary law
systems. These reflections grow out of my experience over the past
ten years, advising constitutional reformers in countries around the
* Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law and Director, Center for Constitutional
Democracy, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
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world. At the Center for Constitutional Democracy' at Indiana
University, my husband David and I work with reformers in Burma,
Liberia, South Sudan, Libya, and Vietnam to help them develop
constitutional mechanisms for building democratic institutions,
democratic practices, and democratic cultures.
In many of these countries, one of the primary barriers to
women's advancement is the resistance of customary systems of law
to gender equality norms. I work with women's groups in these
countries to develop more effective constitutional mechanisms for
dealing with this situation and this lecture grows out of that
experience. Indeed, I will draw most of my examples from Liberia, a
country I know well. The lesson I think I have learned from this
experience, and which I will outline for you today, is that real and
lasting change in customary law is only possible when the women
within traditional communities exercise power in their own customary
systems. Or, to simplify: customary law will be consistent with
gender equality only when women are judges in customary courts.
My argument for this proposition will involve weaving together
strands from cultural anthropology, legal doctrine, and feminist
theory. I will begin by describing for you the status and operation of
customary law systems in many countries and the ways in which
many such systems discriminate against women. I will then briefly
outline the approaches currently taken by various legal systems to try
to bring customary law into compliance with the gender equality
norms that are enshrined in most modem constitutions.
Unfortunately, most of these approaches have had very limited
success.
Then I will take a step back and introduce some ideas about the
nature of culture, judgment, and justice in feminist theory. Finally, I
will tie these strands together and suggest an approach to this problem
that focuses on constitutional mechanisms for helping the women
within traditional communities to shape customary law to fit their
own needs and ideals. I see this approach as part of a larger paradigm
shift that organizes legal reform around the model of women as law-
makers rather than women as rights-holders.
In many countries in Africa and Asia, there are systems of
customary law that predate the formal, state-based legal system and
1. CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, http://ccd.indiana.edu (last visited
Nov. 13, 2013).
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that continue to exist alongside it. 2 Customary systems are sometimes
blended with religious legal systems, but they can also have their
roots in tribal or ethnic cultures that are not understood in
predominantly religious terms. Such systems tend to have different
rules from the formal legal system: they are enforcing tradition and
custom rather than enforcing the statutes passed by the legislature.
Most customary systems focus on family-related issues-such as
marriage, divorce, and custody-and property related issues, but they
often include some rules regarding criminal behavior as well. Their
rules on these issues are not the same as the rules in the formal laws;
for example, statutory law in Liberia requires monogamy, but
customary law for many of the tribes includes polygamy.4
Customary systems also tend to have different procedures from
the formal legal system. There are no lawyers, there are no rules of
evidence, and the process often involves consultation with multiple
constituencies in the community: families, neighbors, and elders.
Judges are not specialized officials. They are usually the chiefs or
elders who guide the community in all other ways as well.5 In some
places, like Liberia, trial by ordeal is a traditional part of customary
procedure.
In countries like Liberia and South Sudan, systems of customary
law are a crucial fact of life for several reasons. First, the
governments in these countries do not have the capacity to provide a
2. Aili Tripp, Conflicting Agendas? Women 's Rights and Customary Law in
African Constitutional Reform, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173, 184-89 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2011).
3. A Concise Summary of Islamic Law (Sharia) From its Inception to the
Present, UNIV. OF PA. 2-3, http://www.upenn.edu/emeritus/events/IslamicLaw.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (explaining that many systems of sharia law can be
understood as a form of customary law with a religious foundation. Indeed, sharia
systems are often a complex mixture of religion and custom).
4. Felicia V. Coleman, Gender Equality and the Rule of Law in Liberia:
Statutoly Law, Customary Law, and the Status of Women, in CONSTITUTING
EQUALITY, supra note 2, at 202.
5. Deborah H. Isser et al., Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences with and
Perceptions of Local Justice Options, U.S. INST. OF PEACE 23-24 (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/liberianjusticepw63.pdf [hereinafter Looking
for Justice]; Aleu Akechak Jok et al., A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary
Southern Sudan, WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL 8 (Mar. 2004), http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTJUSFORPOOR/Resources/JoketalStudyofCustomaryLawinConte
mporarySouthSudan.doc [hereinafter Stud].
6. See Controversial Practices: Trial by Ordeal in Liberia, VOICE OF AMERICA,
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2006-10-27-voal9/398774.html (last visited
Aug. 5, 2013).
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formal legal system that is accessible to people in remote areas. In
both countries, once you leave the major cities, there are few
courthouses, lawyers, or judges. In rural areas, people would need to
travel substantial distances over poor or non-existent roads to reach a
state-based court. And, once they got there, the costs of litigating a
claim-both the official costs, such as court and attorney's fees, and
the unofficial costs, such as bribes-would make it impossible for
7
many people to pursue a case.
In short, the formal legal system is simply not available to many
people as a mechanism for dealing with disputes or even for handling
most crimes. As a result, in Liberia, for example, a recent study
found that only 3% of civil cases were taken to a formal court, while
38% went to a customary mechanism: people were twelve times more
likely to choose a customary court.8 The numbers are similar in
South Sudan.9 In short, whether outsiders like it or not, customary
systems of justice are a fact of life in these countries for the
foreseeable future because the formal justice system does not have the
capacity to provide services to the majority of the population.
In addition, many people in these communities prefer their
customary systems to the formal system and will choose it even when
the formal system is available. They prefer the customary system for
two reasons. First, they believe that the formal court system is
controlled by people with money and influence and they do not trust
it to provide justice. In places like Liberia, where corruption is
endemic, this is probably an accurate perception.10 And second, they
prefer the customary system because it has a more restorative and less
retributive orientation. The goal of most customary proceedings is to
repair the social relations damaged by the crime or dispute, rather
than to punish the wrongdoer. As a result, these proceedings try to
address the underlying issues that might have generated the problem
and they involve families and community members in the resolution.
7. See Looking for Justice, supra note 5, at 39-42.
8. Id. at 4. Fifty-nine percent (59%) were taken to no forum at all. Id. The
numbers for criminal cases are even more dramatic: 2% to the formal justice system;
45% to the customary system; and 53% to no forum. Id.
9. See Study, supra note 5, at 6 ("Over 90% of day-to-day criminal and civil
cases are executed under customary law.").
10. Liberia Second on Global Bribery List, ALLAFRICA.cOM, http://allafrica.com/
stories/201307110941.htmi (last visited Aug.5, 2013) ("Seventy five per cent of
Liberians who responded to Transparency International's survey on global corruption
admitted to having paid a bribe to a public body in the last year.").
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Because of this orientation, many people believe that the customary
system addresses their problems more effectively than the formal
system.1
So, customary legal systems are both necessary and desired by
the people in many places. In light of this fact, it should not be
surprising that customary legal systems are explicitly or implicitly
recognized by the constitutions in many countries. The constitutions
often specify that such systems may operate with respect to certain
subjects or include provisions recognizing the traditional authorities
in these systems, such as chiefs. Thus, customary law systems are
both a reality of life and a recognized part of law in many countries.
But such systems are also deeply problematic because they often
violate human rights and other constitutional norms. In particular,
most customary systems include gender discriminatory rules or
procedures. For example, in Liberia, in many of the cultures, wives
have no right to inherit their dead husband's property-it goes to his
parents or brothers instead. Indeed, widows are seen as part of that
property and are expected to marry one of their dead husband's
brothers. Daughters have no right to inherit their father's property.
After divorce, women have no right to custody of their children.12
Early marriage for girls is expected in many groups, leading to
serious health issues and a loss of educational opportunity.' 3 In some
groups, spousal abuse is tolerated. In some groups, female genital
mutilation, or "FGM", is practiced.14 Traditionally, women cannot be
chiefs in most groups, which means that they cannot serve as judges
for customary disputes. And, in some groups, it is considered
unseemly for women to speak in mixed gatherings, so they will be
discouraged from participating in the hearing in a customary case in
I1. See Study, supra note 5 (discussing South Sudan); Looking for Justice, supra
note 5, at 3-4 (discussing Liberia). I base this claim not only on the scholarship
referenced here, but also on my own conversations with people in Liberia, including
a conversation with Ma Musu, a remarkable woman who works for the Tribal
Council in Monrovia, in January of 2013.
12. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 200-01; Gender Equality and Social
Institutions in Liberia, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS & GENDER INDEx, http://genderindex.or
g/country/liberia (last visited Aug. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Gender Equality in Liberia].
13. See Gender Equality in Liberia, supra note 12. ("In reality, data from the
2007 Demographic and Household Survey reports that 20.2% of girls between 15 and
19 years of age were married, divorced or widowed."). Child Marriage: Girls 14 and
Younger at Risk, INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S HEALTH COALITION, http://www.iwhc.or
g/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=3487&Itemid=629 (last visited
Aug. 6, 2013) (discussing the impact of early marriage on education and health).
14. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 197.
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any form. In short, both in terms of the substantive rules and in terms
of the process of decision, customary systems often discriminate
against women.
Now, the gender discriminatory nature of many customary law
systems raises a serious constitutional problem. Almost all modem
constitutions include an equality guarantee that specifies that
discrimination on the basis of sex or gender is prohibited.'" If the
constitution also includes clauses either explicitly or implicitly
recognizing customary law systems, then there is a tension between
the equality guarantee and the customary law provisions that must
somehow be resolved.' 6 There are three possible approaches to this
conflict.
First, it would be possible to say that the constitution should not
recognize customary law and should simply insist on a single legal
system, which is subject to the equality guarantee. Some feminist
theorists, such as Susan Moller Okin, have advocated this approach.' 7
As I have suggested already, regardless of whether or not one thinks
this is a theoretically attractive solution, it is simply not practical in
many of these countries.
Second, one might recognize customary law and insulate it from
the application of other constitutional norms, such as equality. In
other words, the constitution might recognize two separate legal
systems: the state-based system, which is subject to the equality
guarantee, and the customary system, which is not. Some political
15. E.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. I I(b) ("All
persons, irrespective of ethnic background, race, sex, creed, place of origin or
political opinion, are entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual, subject to such qualifications as provided for in this Constitution."); id.
art. I I(c) ("All persons are equal before the law and are therefore entitled to the equal
protection of the law.").
16. The Liberian Constitution recognizes customary law or traditional authorities
in several places. See. e.g., id. art. 5(b) (mandating that The Republic shall "preserve,
protect and promote positive Liberian culture, ensuring that traditional values which
are compatible with public policy and national progress are adopted and developed");
id. art. 23(b) ("The Legislature shall enact laws to govern the devolution of estates
and establish rights of inheritance and descent for spouses of both statutory and
customary marriages so as to give adequate protection to surviving spouses and
children of such marriages."); id. art. 56(b) ("There shall be elections of Paramount,
Clan and Town Chiefs by the registered voters in their respective localities, to serve
for a term of six years."); id. art. 65 ("The courts shall apply both statutory and
customary laws in accordance with the standards enacted by the Legislature.").
17. See generally Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalisn Bad for Women?, in Is
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7-26 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
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theorists of multiculturalism, such as Chandran Kukathas, have
suggested this approach'" and a number of African countries have
adopted constitutional provisions immunizing customary law from the
gender equality requirement. 19 From a feminist perspective however,
such an approach is unacceptable because it represents an
abandonment of gender equality norms in precisely the areas of life
most crucial to women, such as family relations.
Both of these strategies suffer from an additional problem: by
casting the decision as a simple "either/or" choice between culture
and equality, these approaches fail to recognize women's interests in
being active members in and shapers of their culture.20 Women are
not merely the victims of culture; they act with agency, engaging with
and reforming cultural policy. Constructing the problem as culture
versus equality, where the legal system simply has to choose a side,
casts women as the passive victims of culture rather than as its active
creators. In so doing, it both falsifies the situation in which many
women find themselves-a situation in which they feel committed to
both their culture and their equality-and obscures possibilities for
resolving these tensions in more productive ways.
The third possibility then, is for the constitution to recognize
customary law, but try to move it toward consistency with the
provisions of the bill of rights, including the equality guarantee.
Restated, the constitution might try to protect both customary legal
systems and gender equality, rather than abandoning one or the other
as in the options discussed earlier. There are several constitutional
mechanisms that different countries have tried to use to bring
customary law into consistency with equality.
Some constitutions explicitly limit the protection for custom to
those practices that are consistent with equality. In South Africa, for
example, Article 31 of the Constitution protects the right of all
persons to enjoy their culture, but specifies that this right "may not be
exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of
Rights."2' In theory, this is an excellent solution and I think it is a
good idea for constitutions that recognize customary law to include
18. See Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES 238, 247-48 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995).
19. See Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in
Connonwealth Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 289, 305 (2007).
20. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 3 (2001).
21. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996, art. 31.
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such clauses. But, in practice, this approach has often proven to be
less than effective.
Clauses like this one are relatively rarely enforced. There is
little enforcement partly because women find it difficult to get to
court to raise a challenge based on the constitution, and partly
because courts in countries where customary law is a meaningful fact
of life are often unwilling to enforce such limits and interfere with
custom. 2 2 So the provisions, where they exist, often go unenforced.
But even where women have made it to court and the courts
have been willing to enforce limits on customary law, such litigation
has often led to an even worse situation for women. When the
government tries to intervene and force a traditional community to
change its rules regarding women, the community often responds by
becoming defensive, hardening its stance, and putting pressure on the
women involved to renounce their rights. Ayelet Shachar has called
this response "reactive culturalism." 23 The result is that women in
these communities are seen as traitors if they invoke the protection of
the state against traditional practices. This social pressure then makes
life much harder for the women in these communities and essentially
forecloses them from enforcing their rights in most cases.24 In short,
where the state' tries to force change on traditional communities in
order to promote women's rights, the women inside those
communities often suffer. Thus, a constitutional provision designed
to generate such external pressure for change-while it express an
important public value and may be useful as a last resort in extreme
cases-is not an effective way to make life better for the women in
traditional communities.
Another strategy tried in some places is to explicitly prohibit
those specific cultural practices that are seen as most damaging to
women. For example, the constitution or statutes could prohibit FGM
or polygamy or could set a minimum age for marriage. There has
been a global campaign to get governments to pass laws prohibiting
FGM, so this issue provides a good test case for the effectiveness of
this "specific prohibition" strategy.25 I believe that such laws are
22. See Bond, supra note 19, at 335-36.
23. SHACHAR, supra note 20, at 35-37.
24. See Martha C. Nussbaum, India, Sex Equality, and Constitutional Law, in
THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 174, 190-91 (Beverley Baines &
Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2005) (describing the Shah Bano case).
25. See Elizabeth Heger Boyle et al., International Discourse and Local Politics:
Anti-Female-Genital-Cutting Laws in Egypt, Tanzania, and the United States, 48
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important as a symbolic gesture and may be a useful first step in
changing attitudes and cultural expectations, but they do not seem to
be sufficient to end practices like FGM.26 In some cases, the laws
have been passed merely to satisfy an international audience, with no
real commitment on the part of the government. Even where the
law reflects the sincere belief of the governing elite, there is rarely the
enforcement capacity or the political will to apply the law to the
millions of girls and women subjected to the practice each year.28
The result is that, in some of the countries where the practice is
illegal, FGM continues to be the norm rather than the exception in
many local communities.29 It is necessary to have laws prohibiting
the most egregious forms of human rights violations against women,
but we should not expect those laws to actually prevent such practices
in most cases. We must be looking for other solutions.
A more recent strategy that has been suggested is to create an
enforceable right for women to participate in the formation of custom
and culture.30 Article 17 of the Protocol on the Rights of Women to
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, for example,
says, "Women shall have the right to participate at all levels in the
determination of cultural policies."3'
This provision is an important step in a new direction. It seeks
to give women not merely rights, but roles within the cultural
institutions that are oppressing them. As the attempts to impose
equality rights or rights against FGM demonstrate, without the power
Soc. PROBs. 524, 534 (2001) [hereinafter International Discourse] ("[B]etween 1980
and 1998, twenty-four of the twenty-five countries where female genital cutting is
prevalent and most Western countries, adopted laws or policies specifically designed
to eradicate the practice.").
26. See Sarah R. Hayford, Conformitv and Change: Community Effects on
Female Genital Cutting in Kenya, 46 J. HEALTH Soc. BEHAV. 121 (2005).
27. E.g., International Discourse, supra note 25, at 531 (explaining that early
partial bans in Egypt under Nasser were never enforced and had little effect).
28. Female Genital Mutilation, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who
.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ (last updated Feb. 2013) ("About 140 million
girls and women worldwide are currently living with the consequences of FGM.").
29. E.g., Ban Al-Dhayi, Towards Abandoning Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
in Somalia Once and For All, UNICEF (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.unicef.org/somal
ia/reallives_ 12335.html (explaining that the prevalence rate of FGM in Somalia is
estimated at 98%, despite the fact that the new 2012 Constitution outlaws it).
30. E.g., Johanna Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 509, 547 (2010).
31. PROTOCOL To THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON
THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA, 2003, art. 17(2), available at http://www.achpr.o
rg/files/instruments/women-protocol/achprinstr_proto_women eng.pdf.
33
2013]
THOMAS JEFFERSON LAW REVIEW
to influence these institutions, rights will never be effective. It is
because women lack such power and influence that they have been
largely unable to use the rights their constitutions already give them.
Thus, what women need in order to make their rights effective is the
power to make and shape the norms that affect their lives.
This orientation represents a fundamental shift in paradigm,
comparable to the shift that took place when women moved from
being seen as property to being seen as rights-holders themselves.
The new shift is, to borrow a phrase from Ruth Rubio Marin, to move
from understanding women primarily as rights-holders to
understanding them as norm-creators, exercising power within social
institutions.32 Women cannot be merely the beneficiaries of the legal
system; they must also be the makers and masters of that system.
The difficulty with the particular mechanism in the Protocol,
however, is that it represents an incomplete paradigm shift. It
recognizes the need for women to exercise power within cultural
systems, but it structures the remedy for their current powerlessness
as another right. And that structure guarantees that it will continue to
be ineffective in the same way as all the other rights already
discussed. In fact, when I was in Liberia a few weeks ago, discussing
this issue with a large group of women activists, they were very
skeptical about the ability of women to effectively demand such
participation rights or of the legal system to enforce them.33 So, this
more recent strategy points toward the transformation that is
necessary, but does not sufficiently escape the old rights-based
paradigm.
Now let me take that step back that I promised and bring in some
feminist theory. The problem we face is how to explain and justify
the need to expand our focus in thinking about women's equality.
Why are rights not enough? Why is a paradigm shift necessary and
how should we think about the new model of women's role so as to
facilitate greater equality? My suggestion is that feminist theory can
help us to answer these questions.34  I will draw here on feminist
32. Conversation with Ruth Rubio Marin and the author (Aug. 2012).
33. Discussion at Gender Forum sponsored by the Constitution Review
Committee and Law Reform Commission of the Government of Liberia (Jan. 2013)
(Monrovia, Liberia).
34. For a more detailed version of this argument, see generally Susan H.
Williams, Democratic Theory, Feminist Theory, and Constitutionalism: The
Challenge of Multiculturalisn in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM 393, 394 (Beverly
Baines et al. eds., 2010).
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understandings of culture and of judgment and of justice, and that will
bring us back to women as judges in customary law systems.
Some of the arguments for cultural rights seem to rely on what
has been called a "billiard ball" model of culture.35 The billiard ball
model sees cultures as mutually exclusive, having clear boundaries
and determinate contents. In opposition to this model, feminist
theorists such as Seyla Benhabib and Anne Phillips offer a social
constructivist account of culture in which cultural communities have
long interacted and shaped one another, and they have been internally
heterogenous and contested from the start.37 Sarah Song describes
four elements of this constructivist model: (1) "cultures are the
products of specific and complex historical processes, not fixed
primordial entities"; (2) "cultures are internally contested, negotiated,
and reimagined by members, who are sometimes motivated by their
interactions with outsiders"; (3) "cultures are not isolated but rather
overlapping and interactive"; and (4) "cultures are loose-jointed ...
the loss or change of one strand does not necessarily bring down the
entire culture."38
For our purposes, the most important aspect of this model is the
internally contested nature of cultures. We must pay attention to the
power dynamics within a group and the ways in which the cultural
community's interaction with the legal system affects the status,
power, and resources of subgroups within the cultural community.
Certain forms of legal recognition for culture have a systematic effect
of supporting traditional authority figures in the community and their
views of the culture, at the expense of the power and perspectives of
more marginalized groups, including women. For example, reserving
seats in the legislature for particular cultural groups or incorporating
traditional cultural norms into the state legal system both tend to
strengthen traditional leaders-who are overwhelmingly male-as
35. JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF
DIVERSITY 10 (1995) [hereinafter STRANGE MULTIPLICITY] (describing and criticizing
this model); Iris Marion Young, Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of
Group Political Conflict, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 155, 157-61 (Will
Kymlicka, ed., 1995).
36. STRANGE MULTIPLICITY, supra note 35, at 10.
37. ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 8-9 (2007); SEYLA
BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA
175 (2002).
38. SARAH SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM
31-32 (2007).
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against more marginal or progressive elements in the community.39
There is no neutral position for the state here: action and inaction both
have consequences for the distribution of power and status inside the
cultural community.
Thinking about culture as fluid and contested focuses our
attention on the crucial role of judges. In customary systems, rules
are not made through a legislative process: the rules are understood as
already given through tradition. But that does not mean that the rules
are static. They grow and change over time and their interpretation
and application is often contested within the community. The process
through which this change and contestation takes place is the judicial
process: the hearing of cases. That is, the customary law is a common
law system. And judges are the people with the power to create and
recreate the norms in that system.
What exactly is it that judges are doing when they engage in this
sort of common law method? Feminist writing on the concept of
judgment suggests that we need to reform our understanding of this
concept as well. As Jennifer Nedelsky has pointed out, judgment is
not about factual accuracy or certainty. Indeed, it is precisely in those
areas of life where such factual accuracy or certainty is not possible
that we tend to speak about the exercise of judgment. Judgment is
best understood in a relational way, as asking us to reflect on our own
perceptions and experiences, to consider the perspectives of others,
and to reach an understanding that responds to moral and sometimes
social concerns, as well as to empirical ones.40 In other words, the
exercise of judgment is a creative process, in which the judge is not
merely declaring a fact that pre-exists her decision, but creating a
social reality through the process of decision. It is this creative power
that women need to exercise in order to make their rights a reality.
Another way to see this is to think about Nancy Fraser's model
of justice as parity of participation.4' She suggests that real equality
of participation includes three related but independent aspects: first,
people must be recognized and respected; second, people must
control sufficient material resources to participate fully; and third,
39. See PHILLIPS, supra note 37, at 168-69.
40. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAw's RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY, AND LAW 58 (2011).
41. NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE 145 (2009) [hereinafter SCALES]; Nancy
Fraser, Identity. Exclusion, and Critique: A Response to Four Critics, 6 EUR. J. OF
POL. TH. 305, 313 (2007) [hereinafter Identity].
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people must have voice and representation in the institutions that
affect them.42 As I have written elsewhere, customary law systems
generally fail to provide all three of these requirements. But even if
the first two could be corrected, and the systems could be forced to
give women respect and to redistribute material resources to them,
such systems still would not be just if they did not also give women
voice and power to participate in the creation of the rules.
So, feminist understandings of culture, judgment, and justice
help us to see why we need a paradigm shift. Giving women rights,
while important and necessary, will never be sufficient because the
rights operate within a cultural context in which women are
disempowered. Only by giving women the power to change that
culture from the inside-to be the norm-creators in that cultural
enterprise-can we assure that they are able to enjoy their rights. I
believe that the global movement toward electoral gender quotas for
women in legislatures is one manifestation of this shift in paradigm.4
In relation to customary law, this paradigm shift suggests that
the focus of our legal reforms should not be on mapping out in
advance the particular forms that customary practices or institutions
should take, but rather on designing incentives, opportunities, and
resources that will allow women in these communities to play a more
active and central role in creating their future culture. The new model
seeks to give women not only rights, but resources and opportunities
that they can use to shape their own traditions. And it seeks to create
incentives for traditional leaders to include women in the process of
norm-creation within their communities.
The particular form such opportunities or incentives should take
will vary with the legal context. There is no constitutional solution
that fits all sizes here. But I can provide a few examples from the
Liberian context that will illustrate certain principles that can be
adapted to different circumstances in other countries. There are at
least four mechanisms that might be useful in light of this new
paradigm. The first two mechanisms have to do with opening the
42. SCALES, supra note 41, at 6.
43. Susan H. Williams, Customary Law, Constitutional Law, and Women's
Equality, in ENGENDERING GOVERNANCE: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL (Kim
Rubenstein & Katie Young eds.) (forthcoming 2014) (discussing an extended
application of Fraser's framework to the issue of gender quality in customary law).
44. E.g., Susan H. Williams, Equality, Representation, and Challenge to
Hierarchy: Justifying Electoral Quotas for Women, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY,
supra note 2, at 53 (providing an argument for such gender quotas).
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customary system to the possibility of change. The second two
mechanisms have to do with increasing women's ability to be the
agents of that change.
First, in order for women to be able to reshape customary law,
that law must be seen as the expression of a fluid, living culture that
has the capacity to grow and change over time. The constitution can
help to generate this understanding of customary law by specifically
describing custom and tradition in these terms. Particularly, in the
provision that protects custom or tradition, the constitution can
specify that what is being protected are not the rules as they exist at
any particular moment, but the practice of custom and tradition by a
community as it changes and grows over time.
The long-term and general consequence of such a provision
would be to help courts and policymakers to approach customary law
in a different way. Rather than attempting to insulate and preserve
particular customs, they would be guided to strengthen the
community's ability to develop, articulate, and adapt their own
traditions.4 5 This shift in understanding will not happen overnight, of
course, but a provision like this can be one mechanism for
encouraging the gradual development of this attitude.
The more immediate and specific consequence of such a
provision would be to end the practice of codifying customary law.
In Liberia, as in many other African countries, the national legislature
has codified some customary law in statutes intended to be applied by
the legal system. This practice should stop and the existing statutes
should generally be repealed. The practice of codification has the
unfortunate effect of freezing customary law as of the moment it was
memorialized, and generally in a form approved by traditional leaders
without any consideration of dissenting voices within the community.
Customary systems should be encouraged to see themselves as living
parts of the culture, adapting and growing in response to the changing
needs and views of the community. Codification restricts this
process.4 6
45. E.g., Shilubana v. Nwamitwa 2008 (2) SA 66 (CC) at 44 (S. Aft.). The
Constitutional Court of South Africa upheld the decision of a traditional authority to
change its rules and allow a woman to inherit the chieftaincy. Id. This is a
wonderful example of the ability of a community to gradually bring its traditions into
line with the constitutional commitment to gender equality.
46. Susan H. Williams, Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law:
Constitutionalizing Internal Cultural Disruption, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 65, 83
(2011).
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The impetus behind codification efforts is, however,
understandable. The goals of codification are to restrain the discretion
of individual decision-makers and to achieve more consistent
application of the rules across cases. These are perfectly reasonable
goals, but codification is a bad way to achieve them because of its
effect of freezing custom. These goals could be better achieved
through the methods of the common law: i.e., the use of precedent,
which could be facilitated by recording the judgments of customary
courts and making such records widely available. This sort of
information gathering and dissemination, which can be supported by
the government, will benefit the customary system not only by
providing some constraint on discretion and some consistency of
results, but also by creating a knowledge base about how other
communities handle similar issues.
For example, if I can look at case records and determine that the
next village over, which belongs to the same tribe as mine, interprets
its customs so as to allow girls to inherit their father's property, then I
might argue to the chiefs in my village that we can also make this
shift. Providing this kind of knowledge, without tying down the
system through codification, strikes an appropriate balance between
consistency and flexibility. The constitution can contribute to this
process by explicitly protecting custom as a living and changing
system.
Second, the capacity of customary courts needs to be increased
and developed.47 The government can offer a range of opportunities
and resources to customary legal systems that will help to open them
to the possibility of change without coercing them to do specific
things. For example, the government can provide the personnel to
record and maintain the reports of cases, as discussed above. It can
also offer training to customary leaders on the constitution and on
international human rights, so that they have a better understanding of
the legal order as a whole and the values that underlie it. And the
government can provide information and education to customary
judges on issues relating to gender equality, for example, by giving
47. In a recent conversation with an UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) official in
Monrovia, I was told that, while large sums of money have been devoted by the
international community to building the capacity of the state-based legal system in
Liberia, no money has been provided to increase the capacity of the customary
system. Conversation at the Constitutional Conference, Constitution Review
Committee and Law Reform Commission of the Government of Liberia (Jan. 2013)
(Monrovia, Liberia).
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them the data that shows that increasing the status of women is one of
the most effective mechanisms for increasing the wealth and welfare
of the society as a whole. The goal here is not to turn customary
courts into just another kind of state agency, but to broaden the
horizons of those who are exercising judgment in such courts.
Once the courts have been opened up to the possibility of change
and evolution in custom, then women inside traditional communities
need to be given the resources and opportunities to become effective
participants in shapirig their cultures. There is no simple way to
achieve this goal, but there are at least two interrelated strategies.
First, the women in these communities need to be offered
resources to increase their capacities, in the form of education,
economic empowerment, leadership training, and so on. One avenue,
which has been promoted with great energy and determination by the
Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia, is education for women
about the legal rights and remedies available to them.49 In addition,
the reconstruction of the educational system-with particular
attention to the encouragement of school attendance by girls-is a
crucial, long-term support for the ability of girls and women to shape
their communities. This connects to a whole series of issues related
to breaking down barriers to girls' education, including: elimination
of school fees, ensuring girls' safety in and on the way to school, and
public education concerning the value of educated girls to the
community.5 0
The second strategy is to create incentives for the traditional
authorities in such communities to support women in accessing such
resources, and to increase the levels of women's participation in
positions of influence over the customary systems. This strategy is
necessary because women will not be able to take advantage of
resources such as education and economic empowerment unless their
communities support them in that effort. And, once they have those
resources, they will be unable to translate their increased capacities
into increased influence over customary systems unless they are given
48. Gender Equality and Development, THE WORLD BANK 22 (2012),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-12996999685
83/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf.
49. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 207-09.
50. See generally Barriers to Girls' Education, Strategies and Interventions,
UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/teachers/girls_ed/BarrierstoGE.pdf (last visited Aug.
6, 2013) (providing an excellent summary of the barriers and possible responses to
them).
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entry to positions of power in those systems. So, the central question
posed by this paradigm shift is: how can the law provide incentives
for traditional authorities to cooperate with and support these
projects?
This is a question that can only be answered in a particular legal
context and that will probably require some creativity and some trial
and error to develop effective responses. But I can give you some
examples of programs designed to create such incentives. Imagine a
scholarship program for young people from disadvantaged rural areas
to attend the university. And imagine that, as the percentage of girls
from a certain locality increases, the total amount of scholarship aid
given to each student from that locality also increases. If the
community wants its sons to get the most benefit from such a system,
it will need to include its daughters as well.
Or, perhaps the government might offer greater recognition to
the customary system as the role of women in that system increases.
So, if a community makes women judges within its system and
increases the participation of women in hearings, then the range of
cases it can handle and the respect for its judgments in the state-based
courts might be increased. This linkage should help recruit traditional
leaders, who want more scope for customary law, to support the
inclusion of women in positions of power in the system. My point is
not to endorse these particular programs, but to point us toward
asking the right question-we need to think creatively about ways of
getting traditional leaders to facilitate women's empowerment rather
than acting as a barrier to it.
Let me use the Liberian example to make one final. point in
conclusion. I understand that there is a great risk in turning to
internal community evolution to deal with the problem of gender
discrimination in customary law systems. The cultural evolution that
this model hopes to encourage is often a very slow process and, in the
meantime, the women in these communities will be harmed by the
persistent gender inequalities enforced by customary law. Even if
there is some minimum protection that is afforded by the state legal
system so that extreme forms of coercion will not be tolerated, there
remains a wide scope for harm and discrimination by their
communities. I do not in any way wish to minimize the costs that
women will bear during the time it takes for them' to gradually change
their cultures. But, based on my experience working in countries
facing this challenge, I nonetheless believe that accepting these costs
is often the best path to a future of greater equality.
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In the long run, the welfare of the women in traditional
communities depends on their ability to participate effectively in the
shaping of their culture. The only way to avoid reactive culturalism
and to make stable progress toward equality is for the cultural
community to move towards this future through mechanisms it
understands to be voluntary. "Voluntary" doesn't mean that the
community is unaffected by interaction with and even pressure from
other cultures-that kind of isolation has almost never been the case
for cultural change. But it does mean that the responses to these
pressures must be experienced as generated through a process internal
to the community, rather than one imposed from outside. Otherwise,
even if a particular case can be resolved so as to help an individual
woman, the cultural reaction generated by the imposed solution will
mean that other women in the community will pay a cost: their efforts
at cultural challenge and growth will be set back.
In other words, in the long run, opening up the channels for
internal change in customary communities is a necessary part of
reaching greater equality. It is not sufficient, to be sure, but greater
equality cannot be achieved without it. And that is why attention to
the ways in which the state and larger society can use their resources,
including the law, to encourage a more open attitude toward change
and to expand the role of women in creating the norms of their
cultures must be central. In the end, women will have equality under
the law only when women participate fully in the making of the law,
whether as legislators in the state-based system or as judges in
customary law systems.
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